Abstract: Scholars of social science have increasingly been describing advanced capitalist societies as knowledge societies, based on a series of key assumptions about post-industrialism'. My contribution challenges this new`conventional wisdom' (John K. Galbraith) on several points. I rst argue that it veils the`dark sides' of capitalism, i.e. worker alienation, class relationships and class struggle. I then show how knowledge society experts all too often contribute to the individualization of social problems. Further on, I challenge the assumption according to which contemporary human resources management creates a new kind of work relationship based on mutual respect, objectivity and justice. Finally, I try to understand the very success of the new`conventional wisdom'. The relative autonomy of science and education might be the most important reason why so many social science scholars as well as ordinary people today believe they are living in a knowledge society.
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Peter Streckeisen lity, knowledge society oers new opportunities to everyone, because access to knowledge, i.e. investment in human capital by the individual has become far more important than belonging to a specic social class. Even political power is shaken by the growing inuence of knowledge as more and more people are able to challenge those in power and to articulate their own perspective on political problems.
But do such assumptions give us an accurate description of contemporary societies and social realities? The answer to this question depends very much on whom and what this new point of view is supposed to be useful for. For persons committed to critically analyzing social reality and ghting social inequality and the domination of a minority over the majority, all the assumptions mentioned above seem too good to be true. This contribution challenges and deconstructs this new conventional wisdom on several points. After the introduction (section 0), I rst argue that this way of looking at society veils the`dark sides' of capitalism, i.e. worker alienation, class relationships and class struggle, as well as the ongoing waste of natural resources and environmental destruction. Social scientists have long tried to get rid of these`ghosts of the past' by inventing new concepts aimed at (un)naming capitalist societal formations (section 1). Further on, I show how knowledge society experts contribute to the individualization of social problems by claiming that individuals now considered as`human capitalists' must always be held responsible for their own situation. According to this view, state interventions must be limited to setting up equal starting conditions for all and`activating' entrepreneurial spirit among those who are lacking it (section 2). I then discuss the assumption according to which contemporary human resources management creates a new kind of work relationship based on mutual respect, objectivity and justice with regard to individual performance. This part uses the results of an inquiry of working conditions at Novartis, a leading Swiss pharmaceutical corporation (section 3). Finally I argue that the relative autonomy of science and education in capitalist societies might be an important factor in order to understand the success of the new conventional wisdom. In other words, we must try to identify the reasons why so many social science scholars as well as ordinary people believe they are living in a knowledge society.
Any such explanation must take into account existing societal structures as well as the class relations that shape the everyday life experience of these persons (section 4).
Always Look on the Bright Side of Life
Debates about knowledge work and knowledge society are nothing new. Half a century ago management guru Peter F. Drucker (1959) already argued that unionized industrial workers were being displaced by a growing number of knowledge workers, while economist Fritz Machlup (1962) attempted to give some empirical ground to these assumptions by analyzing US workforce statistics. Only two years later, Gary S. Becker (1964) started the debate about human capital, a concept that gave birth to a new academic discipline: education economics. In Knowledge Societyor Contemporary Capitalism's Fanciest Dress 183 continental Europe, several scholars coined similar terms to describe what they believed to be an epochal shift. Jacques Ellul (1954) wrote about the technological society. Helmut Schelsky (1965) argued that class relationships and their ensuing conictuality were losing their former importance in a new, and emerging, scientic civilization. In France, the debate about the new working class (Mallet 1963) opened the way to the discovery of a post-industrial society (Touraine 1969) . Daniel Bell's (1973) The Coming of Post-industrial Society summed up this rst period of the debate and enabled a wide-spread diusion of the new concepts.
The authors mentioned above did not limit themselves to describing technological change or the evolution of educational systems. Rather they fashioned a series of assumptions about radical and far-reaching change in the structure and in the functioning of contemporary Western societies. These new concepts were supposed to displace older ones which these authors considered out-dated, because the society to which they referred did no longer exist. Most of all, they did not want to talk about capitalism any more, or even about industrial society.
According to them, such concepts belonged to the past and would not permit to grasp the new social realities that were emerging in the wake of World War II.
It is true that the term industrial society already marked a departure from classical sociological theories about modern capitalism which had been articulated by Max Weber ([1904] 2006), Werner Sombart ([1902] 1987) and others. Theodor W. Adorno (1979) has questioned this departure in an opening speech held at the annual meeting of German sociologists in 1968. But for the partisans of the new conventional wisdom, talking about industrial society instead of capitalism did not go far enough, because this concept remained strongly linked to a series of phenomena belonging to the early development of Western European and North American capitalism, namely the central position of industrial workers and unions; Taylorism and worker alienation; dangers for the health of workers; pauperism; and environmental destruction.
Besides the authors mentioned above, many other economists and social scientists have argued for the emergence of a new society since World War II. In the second half of the 20 th century, a kind of`post syndrome' has spread among the social sciences (Gemperle /Streckeisen 2007 /Streckeisen , 1423 . Most scholars claim that things have changed, that we are living in a society that diers sharply from the past. Hence the inationary use of the prex`post'. Post-Industrialism, which often refers (tacitly or explicitly) to post-capitalism, sums up the basic assumptions of the new conventional wisdom. In the rst period of the debate, most authors predicted a rather bright future. Life conditions would get better, life would be more interesting for most people, conicts and dangers of the past would wither away. Since the 1980s, a more sceptical view has begun to complement this optimistic outlook. Several authors stress the dangers and risks linked to the use of ever more sophisticated technologies and to the uncontrolled spread of information and knowledge. Ulrich Beck's (1986) Risk Society is paradigmatic for this way of saying good-bye to the past while predicting an uncertain future.
Together with Anthony Giddens, Beck has articulated the idea that reexivi-
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Peter Streckeisen ty has become the main characteristic of contemporary society, thus humanity enters second modernity (Beck/Giddens/Lash 1996) .
The theory of reexive modernity bears a striking resemblance to Peter F. Drucker's (1993) penetrated by a particular`spirit' that makes people think about wage labour not as a means to safeguard their subsistence, but as an end in itself. But there is not much sociological benet resulting from the use of the term knowledge to describe contemporary society. Knowledge has played an important role in every society and continues to do so. But we must analyze the social relations and the processes determining the production, the distribution and the appropriation of knowledge before we can say something about its meaning in a given society. Otherwise, why not talk of the car society, or the waste society, or the divorce society, or something else instead of the knowledge society? There have never been so many cars, so much industrial waste and so many divorces as nowadays. But as long as we do not seize the qualitative nature of social relations in contemporary society, concepts to describe society as a whole are not useful and can be highly misleading.
To conclude this rst section, I would like to emphasize that such concepts, describing society as a whole, cannot be proven right or wrong. We can only assess the usefulness of a concept by asking whether its application helps us to understand the functioning of society or not. If we use one concept rather than another, we simultaneously decide to look at certain aspects of social reality instead of others. This means that from a political standpoint such concepts are 
Help Yourself and God May Help You along the Way
The debate about the knowledge society is not purely academic or theoretical.
Governments often use this term in order to explain and justify political pro- Behind this grandiose rhetoric we can discern a two-pronged strategy which is highly relevant for the debate about knowledge society. On the one hand, the LS aims to initiate or strengthen political developments towards a further industrialization, that is, capitalist rationalization of services, educational systems, information and knowledge. Public services are supposed to be privatized, or at least to adopt private sector management practices. The production of knowledge and information is aimed ever more towards economic competitiveness. On the other hand, the LS denes social problems as resulting from decient knowledge, education and (occupational) training. In doing so, the LS stresses one of the key assumptions of the new conventional wisdom, that is, that individuals' situations depend in last resort on how successfully he (or she) has invested in his (or her) human capital. Social problems like unemployment or poverty are seen to result from individual misconduct. Thus, in order to limit unemployment, governments should not create jobs by implementing macro-economic policies.
Rather they should provide incentives and sanctions so that the jobless either engage in further training to improve their`employability', or accept jobs they might have turned down before.
Therefore, the LS strongly promotes so-called active or activating labour market policies, a term that echoes the`workfare' policies developed in the US since the 1980s. The aim of these programs is to bring jobless people back to work as rapidly as possible and almost at any price, which often results in employment Knowledge Societyor Contemporary Capitalism's Fanciest Dress 187 with degraded working and pay conditions. If the unemployed are pushed to do further training, it rarely gives them a chance to get a better job than before;
rather they are told that, in the knowledge society, more knowledge is required in order to preserve their employability. As sociologist Kurt Wyss (2007) German governments at the time.
Workfare policies assume that the unemployed are too passive to nd a new job unless they are activated. Instead of investing actively in their human capital, they expect to receive help from the state which keeps them in a vicious circle of durable unemployment and social exclusion. According to Wyss (2007, 76.) , neo-conservatism, neo-liberalism, and New Labour choose dierent focal points for the implementation of workfare policy. Whereas neo-conservatism highlights the necessity to reduce public assistance benets in order to keep the unemployed out of a so-called poverty trap (Murray 1984) , neo-liberalism stresses the individual duty to take any job available. New Labour seems to be more humane when its partisans emphasize the prominence of education and further job training. But in practice the New Labour approach simply compels the unemployed to adapt themselves to the realities and requirements of the labour market. The obligation to apply for jobs even if there are no appropriate ones, to engage in further training even though it is not requested, and to attend supported employment programs although these contribute insidiously to the stigmatization of the unemployed enhances some kind of Halbbildung (Adorno 1979 ) of the jobless, that is, adaptation under pressure, rather than real education and (occupational) training. To sum up, New labour workfare policies require the unemployed to adapt to a exible labour market by downgrading their own hopes and expectations.
As Wyss (2007, 62.) Beck (1983) held that sociological concepts like social class and estate (Stand ) had lost their previous importance as social inequality was getting individualized. In the age of the Risk society (Beck 1986) In the meantime, the concept of human capital has entered sociological debate 
Management
We have seen that there is a theoretical anity or even a political complicity between knowledge society experts and workfare policies. In this section I will argue that, as regards the description of wage labour in contemporary societies, partisans of the new conventional wisdom all too often echo representations produced by multinational companies without seriously challenging them. Unsurprisingly, companies picture interesting workplaces and enjoyable work relations for both sta management and public relations purposes. Yet social scientists should not mistake these images for reality. By critically investigating workplace realities of the 21 st century they could nd much empirical evidence that won't match these shiny images. Social scientists must be attentive to the jobholders who never appear in the spotlight cast by the new conventional wisdom. These`forgotten' jobholders are not a small minority, but rather the majority of the workforce, as eldwork undertaken at Novartis, a leading Swiss pharmaceutical company (Streckeisen 2008a) , exemplarily shows.
Let me dwell on this a little bit more in detail. Novartis emerged in 1996 from a merger between chemical companies Sandoz and Ciba-Geigy in Basel. The name of the new multinational company was derived from the Latin novae artis, which means`new arts' or`new science'. The merger was not only based on a new concept of industrial production, but also stressed a new rhetoric and imagery. Novartis was not supposed to represent`old chemistry' but incarnate a leading`life sciences company'. Business units that did not t this concept were either sourced out or sold to other companies. Today only pharmaceuticals and a handful of closely related business segments remain in the mother company. With some 100'000 employees, out of which approximately 10 percent are working in or around Basel, Novartis gures among the top ten global pharmaceutical companies. Of course, the company focus on pharmaceuticals was motivated by the fact that this division generated the highest prot rates. Meanwhile thirty kilometres away, at Novartis' biggest European pharmaceutical production site where 1'500 persons are employed, management implements a new paradigm of personal organization called Lean POO (lean production; process oriented organization) (Streckeisen 2008a, 193.) . Until then, workers had been subjected to narrow work prescriptions and control by supervisors. Now, they are supposed to assume responsibility for the production process, to x technical disruptions themselves and to nd solutions to problems as they come. These present-day situations of lab technicians and factory workers at Novartis have a lot in common. In both cases daily working activities are not directly controlled by any supervisor. In the language of human resources management, employees and workers are supposed to work independently and to be`empowered', i.e. able to nd a solution to any problem that comes along the way and to develop and communicate their own ideas about improving working processes, and so on. In the case of lab technicians, this demand for independence is not new; in the case of the workers it is. But in labs as well as in the production plant, the conditions framing the working process are so restricting and powerfully weighing on every single work activity that this independence can't be seriously considered as`freedom'. Almost the same can be said regarding`job variation' or the possibility for employees to be`creative' or to shape their own working conditions and processes. They are formally`independent' and`autonomous' in the language of human resources management; but in reality they act in a corset dened by work prescriptions, just-in-time arrangements, rigorous time constraints, automated processes and sophisticated control software.
This brief description underscores that we can't rely on images produced by human resources managers and multinational companies in order to grasp changing workplace realities. As Harald Wolf (1999) shows, the language of human resources management always oscillates between emphasizing technical efciency and independence or`empowerment' of employees. This oscillation can be explained by the very nature of work under capitalist conditions, which is both autonomous and heteronomous. The rst historic layout of the`Scientic Organization of Work' was formulated by Frederick W. Taylor. It was unilaterally aimed at the improvement of the technical eciency of production. This is not so say that such inections are only pure rhetoric. They have always expressed management attempts to change something in the work process.
But we need empirical investigation in order to grasp what really changes. Any serious inquiry may challenge the assumption that formally autonomous work always bears less alienation than supervised work. After all, alienation results
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Peter Streckeisen from the compelled subjugation of human faculties, needs, and biographies to the requirements of capital consuming abstract labour, because human beings in capitalist societies are caught in an overall societal framework they cannot escape from. On the one hand, the more jobholders are`independent', the more capital aims at the subjugation of their personality as a whole, and the more employees may think about themselves as a human capital. On the other hand, even when work processes seem to be completely controlled and supervised there is still autonomous activity, because workers develop resistance in order tò stay alive' (physically and mentally), and all production would break down if jobholders did nothing else than execute orders.
Instead of debating about`the end of Taylorism', it might therefore be more fruitful for social scientists to stress historical continuities and mutations in thè Scientic Organization of Labour'. Just as Frederick W. Taylor at the beginning of 20 th century, contemporary human resources management aims to give scientic foundations to capitalist work relations, that is, to depoliticize them and
give them an appearance of objectivity and neutrality. It is easy to see that the new conventional wisdom of the knowledge society provides management with many concepts and ideas that can serve this purpose. In the end, we see that the whole argument goes in circles. Knowledge society experts produce the theoretical concepts human resources managers work with, and multinational companies produce workplace representations echoed by social scientists who mistake them for reality in order to validate their own theory.
Private Appropriation of Knowledge and the

Racism of Intelligence
It is not enough to criticize fashionable concepts like that one of the knowledge society. We must try to understand the success of trendy ideas, i.e. why so many social science scholars and even ordinary people endorse and disseminate them. If the production of ideas is the language of real life (Marx/Engels 1978, 26) we must think about the societal conditions that favour the divulgation of certain ideas rather than others. In this last section I will argue that the relative autonomy of science and education in modern capitalist societies might be an important factor in understanding the success of the new conventional wisdom.
It gives ordinary people and social scientists alike many reasons in their everyday life experience to think that it is knowledge that holds social relations together, makes the economy work and determines whether people are successful or not in social and economic life. Yet a critical analysis is able to demonstrate that these assumptions consistently mask the real functioning of social production and the reproduction of social inequality.
In capitalist societies education and science have become elds of their own, So if science needs a certain degree of liberty in order to create ndings and proceedings that are fruitful and operant for capitalist production, this autonomy always remains limited. We must think of it as`relative autonomy' (Bourdieu 1993a). This is not only true of the R&D departments of multinational corporations, but also of public or semi-public research. Today in the age of corporate-led globalization even public research is under increasing political pressure to be directly aimed at improving the`competitiveness of the economy'. In order to be fully exploitable for capitalist production, scientic ndings and proceedings are to make people able and willing to work in capitalist production. Biopolitics favours the development of individual subjectivity in line with a prevailing style of government, be it at the level of a whole state, a business company or another social institution (prison, school, clinic, and so on). National public education systems were and still are of paramount importance for capitalist government.
Schools and universities are under pressure to supply the economy with the skills needed at the moment. This demand can never fully be met because skills requirements change all the time, and pupils and students can impossibly learn in the classroom everything they need to know on the shop oor or in the oce (Alaluf 1986) . Above all, this permanent demand to match skills requirements serves as a mechanism to limit the relative autonomy of the education system vis-à-vis capitalist production.
Education systems are also a centrepiece of cultural and political stability in contemporary capitalist societies. Maintaining an existing social order, that is, to reproduce social inequality and class relations, is as crucial for the functioning of capitalism as the provision of`living knowledge' to the economy. In modern societies supposedly based on liberty, equality, and democracy, the transmission of power and wealth between generations is consistently veiled by meritocratic imagery and rhetoric which appears plausible to both members of the ruling clas- 
Epilogue
I have challenged the overoptimistic outlook of contemporary societies charted by authors who claim the advent of a knowledge society. My argument should not be understood as expressing disdain or neglect with regard to the paramount importance of education and knowledge for the functioning of contemporary and future society. A society in which ideas circulate freely, and where a convincing argument counts more than prot and power might be possible. But claiming that we are already`living in the best of all possible worlds' is not helpful in order to strive for this beautiful goal. As critical thinkers and scholars we should rather dedicate our work to a double mission. First of all, we can try to show that the assertion according to which ideas and knowledge, not power and capital, command contemporary society results from a widespread illusion among intellectuals about themselves and about their role in society. Second, and not less important, we ought to take part in the political struggles against the industrialization and the commodication of science and culture. If we do so, whatever really looks like a knowledge society might come closer to our eyes than ever before.
